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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

KENDALL Q. NORTHERN,
Case No. 900566-CA

Plaintiff & Appellant,
vs.
N. ELDON BARNES, WARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
THROUGH THE BOARD OF PARDONS,

Oral Argument
Priority No. 3

Defendants & Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant Kendall Q. Northern (hereinafter "Northern"), by and
through his counsel Haley & Stolebarger, hereby submits this Reply
Brief in support of his appeal from the Order of Dismissal entered
by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third District Court of
Salt Lake County.

ARGUMENT
A. NORTHERN'S PAROLE DOES NOT RENDER MOOT THE ISSUES BEFORE
THE COURT.
The State argues that since Northern was paroled on July 9,
1991, Northern has received his requested relief and this appeal is
now moot.

This is simply not the case.

By his appeal, Northern

sought not only his immediate release on parole, but also an order
that gives him credit toward his term of parole for all periods of

his incarceration since May 10, 1988, and such other relief as the
Court may determine to be appropriate.
As a result of the rescission of his May 10, 1988, parole
date, and his continued imprisonment, Northern

was forced to

suffer further deprivation of some of his most basic rights for
another two years. Northern was not able to travel, associate with
family and friends, or enjoy numerous other basic freedoms that
would have come with parole, even with its restrictions.

If the

Court finds that the trial court erred in finding that the Board of
Pardon's rescission of Northern's May 10, 1988, parole date was
legal and proper, then Northern

is surely entitled

to some

compensation for the losses he suffered while being improperly
detained and deprived of his rights. While the Court cannot give
back to Northern the years taken or truly compensate him for the
deprivation he endured during those years, it can shorten the
period of his parole, ordering that the terms of the May 10, 1988,
parole be reinstated nunc pro tunc as of May 10, 1988. Clearly, a
controversy still exists and Northern has the requisite standing to
continue to seek redress in this Court.
Also, in November 1990 the Board of Pardons gave Northern a
new parole date of July 9, 1991; yet it did not notify him until
July 2, 1991, that restitution would be a condition of his parole.
Restitution had not been ordered by the Board in 1981 at his
initial hearing, in 1984 at his Reconsideration, or in 1988 at his
April Special Attention hearing.

Northern was then given the

opportunity to contest the restitution at a hearing scheduled for
2

July 15, 1991, six days after his scheduled parole date —
could choose to waive his right to a hearing.

or he

In light of the

events of May 1988, Northern made the only intelligent choice.

A

true and correct copy of the Waiver of Personal Appearance is
attached as Addendum A.

Addendum B is the Board's explanation of

its order, which is replete with arbitrariness, speculation and
illogic; ironically, some of the same qualities that infected the
Board's 1988 decision to rescind Northern's parole.
Finally, this is an issue which affects the interests of all
inmates who are or will become eligible for parole, is likely to
recur in a similar manner to other inmates and yet because of the
extended time periods involved in the habeas and appellate process,
is prone to escaping judicial review.

As such the Court should

hear the case without regard to issues of mootness.

Wickham v.

Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981); Kehl v. Schwendiman. 735
P.2d 413, 415 (Utah App. 1987).
In Wickham, a pretrial detainee at the Weber County jail filed
a habeas corpus petition attacking the conditions of confinement at
the jail.

The trial court granted partial relief in response to

the petition. Unsatisfied with only partial relief, the petitioner
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.

During the pendency of the

appeal, the petitioner moved beyond the pretrial stage.

The

defendants then sought to have the appeal dismissed as moot since
the petitioner was no longer a pretrial detainee.

The Supreme

Court found that petitioner did have standing, stating that:
fl

[t]he law provides no exemption from judicial scrutiny
of unlawful acts which are likely to be repeated because
3

they do not fall within the usual principles of standing
and justiciability.

The fact that present and future detainees will suffer
conditions at the jail for a period of time insufficient
for a case to receive appellate review during the
imposition of such conditions reflects a continuing and
recurring
controversy
sufficient
to
invoke
the
jurisdiction of this Court."
Id. at 899-900.
The actions of the Board of Pardons should not escape judicial
scrutiny merely because the Board of Pardons has now seen fit to
parole Northern. As evidenced by the Utah Supreme Court's opinion
in Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah
1991), issues concerning the role of due process in Board of
Pardons decisions are certainly issues which "affect the public
interest."

Further, the Board of Pardons' failure to provide the

requisite due process continues to occur.

As evidence of this

continued failure the Court need look no further than the Board of
Pardons' handling of Northern's July 9, 1991 parole.

B.

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE BOARD'S
DECISION WAS REASONABLE.

The State asserts that "[t]he issue before this Court is
whether the trial court was correct in concluding that the record
supported the Board of Pardons' decision to rescind petitioner's
prospective parole release date."

Brief of Appellees, p. 10.

Based on this statement, the State devotes a considerable portion
of its brief arguing the correctness of the Board of Pardons'
decision. However, the correctness of the decision of the Board of
4

Pardons is not directly at issue in this case. What is at issue is
whether the trial court correctly concluded that the Board of
Pardons acted properly and within the constitutional limitations
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Foote.1
Recognizing that the actions of the Board of Pardons were
subject to some limitations, the trial court concluded that "once
a parole date has been granted, it cannot be taken away by the
Board of Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably or upon the whim
of the Board members." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order of Dismissal p. 7 (attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum
C).

The trial court then reviewed the Board of Pardons' action

under a "reasonable basis" standard (a standard which appears to be
less stringent than the due process standard required by Foote) and
concluded that as a matter of law there was a "reasonable basis"
for the actions. Id.

As discussed more thoroughly in Northern's

Brief of Appellant and throughout this Reply Brief, the trial
court's legal conclusions are erroneous.
Foote requires that the Board of Pardons have much more than
a "reasonable basis" for their actions. The Board of Pardons must
afford prospective parolees the same due process afforded by
courts.

Foote, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4. By rescinding Northern's

parole date without any new evidence of his danger to the community
and without proper notice to Northern and a hearing, the Board of
1

This issue presents a question of law and is therefore
subject to a strict correctness review, giving no deference to the
trial court's decision. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.
Blomguist. 773 P. 2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); Brinkerhoff v.
Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah App. 1990).
5

Pardons violated not only its own rules, but also some of the most
basis tenets of due process.

However, even though this alone

establishes that the trial court's Order of Dismissal was in error,
the record in this case demonstrates that the Northern's parole
date was rescinded not on a reasonable basis, but on the whim of
the Board of Pardons.
On July 8, 1988, two months after the rescission of Northern's
parole date, the Board of Pardons held what was purported to be the
"rescission hearing" required by Rule 3.10.

During this hearing,

Victoria Palacios, a member of the Board of Pardons, questioned
Northern and made statements which evidence the real basis for the
rescission of Northern's parole date:

this Board's view that the

1980 Board simply did not order Northern to serve enough years in
prison for his crime.

After expressing concern about Northern's

possible dangerousness on the streets, Ms. Palacios stated "that to
release you [Northern] after only eight years is to depreciate the
value of his [the victim's] life and ignore the impact on the
Hambys [the victim's family]." Transcript of July 8, 1988 hearing,
p. 30 (attached to Appellees' Brief as Addendum D).

In affirming

the Board or Pardon's rescission, the unnamed "Chairperson" at the
July 8 hearing also stated that the concerns expressed by Ms.
Palacios were the basis for the rescission.

Id. at p. 36.

From this hearing, it is clear that the real reason for the
rescission of Northern's May 1988 parole date was that the 1988
Board of Pardons simply disagreed with the decision of the 1981
Board of Pardons.

Its Notice of Decision, attached hereto as
6

Addendum C, in which the reasons for recision are noted as
"appropriate punishment" and "risk to society," based on the nature
of his crime, confirm the basis of the Board's decision: its desire
for additional retribution.

The Board then sought to justify its

actions by claiming reliance on evidence that was neither new nor
that demonstrated that Northern was a risk to society as required
by Rule 3.10.
In his deposition, Paul Boyden, a Board member in 1988,
described the impact of letters it had received regarding the
victim and his family (Deposition of Paul Boyden, p. 37), new Board
sentencing guidelines that set longer sentences for this kind of
offense (Deposition of Paul Boyden, p. 87-88), and the power of the
1988 Board to set aside "improvident" action by the 1981 Board
(Deposition of Paul Boyden, p. 75). This testimony, guarded though
it was, confirms the real basis for the Board's action.

Such

whimsical, arbitrary decision are intolerable, have no reasonable
basis and cannot pass the muster of due process as required by
Foote.

C.

NORTHERN HAD A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
AT THE TIME THE BOARD OF PARDONS DETERMINED THE ACTUAL
NUMBER OF YEARS HE WAS TO BE IMPRISONED.

The State next contends that Northern has "no substantial
constitutional

right to be released on parole prior to the

expiration of his sentence."

Brief of Appellees, p. 13.

Such a

statement again demonstrates that the State misapprehends both the
issues of this case and the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in
7

Foote.

Simply put, this case is about the trial court's error in

failing to recognize the illegality of the Board's conduct and its
failure to afford Northern his constitutional right to due process.
In attempting to support its position, the State relies on the
case of Kelly v. Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board, 637 P. 2d 858
(Okl.Cr. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 923 (1982).

A review of

Kelly shows such reliance to be disingenuous at best. The facts of
the case suggest that under the sentencing scheme employed in Kelly
the trial court imposed any prison sentence.

After a certain

fraction of that sentence had been served, a prisoner could, but
was not required to, be considered for parole.

Id.

Thus, the

"parole docket date" which respondents attempt to equate to the
parole date given Northern is merely a date on which a prisoner
could be considered for parole and not an actual parole date. Id.
As such, the reasoning of the Oklahoma court is of no consequence
to the instant case.
What does have significance in this case is the reasoning of
the Utah Supreme Court which has expressly stated that in giving a
prisoner a parole date, thereby determining the length of the
prisoner's sentence, the Board of Pardons must afford the prisoner
the same due process protections found in the courts.
Utah Adv. Rep. at 4.

Foote, 156

Additionally, in giving Northern a parole

date, the Board of Pardons created an expectation of parole,
thereby creating a due process liberty interest in parole release.
See, Board of Pardons v. Allen. 482 U.S. 369 (1987). By failing to
follow its own procedural rules and by failing to give Northern
8

notice of the evidence relied on and reasons for the rescission of
his May 1988 parole date along with an appropriate hearing, the
Board of Pardons has failed to give Northern that to which he has
a constitutional right —

D.

due process.

NO "NEW EVIDENCE" EXISTED TO JUSTIFY RESCISSION OF
NORTHERN'S PAROLE DATE.

Board of Pardons7 Rule 3.10 states that a parole date may be
rescinded if "new evidence is presented which shows that the
prisoner, if released, would present a serious risk or danger to
the community."

The State contends, and the trial court agreed,

that such new evidence existed to support the rescission of
Northern's May 1988 parole date.
Northern does not contend that there was absolutely no
evidence to support the rescission of his parole date.

Rather,

Northern contends that there was no "new evidence" within Rule 3.10
to support the Board of Pardons' actions.
Given its plain and literal meaning2, the term "new evidence"
must be defined as evidence which was previously unknown or of
recent or fresh origin.

See, Black's Law Dictionary 940 (5th ed.

1979)(Defining "new"). Further support for this definition of "new
evidence" is found in Ready v. United States Parole Commission, 483
F.Supp. 1273 (M.D.Pa. 1980).
In Ready, a federal prisoner filed a petition for writ of

2

A statute or regulation should generally be construed
according to its plain and literal language. See e.g.. Brinkerhoff
v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989).
9

habeas corpus alleging that the Parole Commission had improperly
rescinded his parole. Under the federal parole scheme at the time,
a parole could be rescinded only "upon receipt of new information
adverse to the prisoner regarding matters other than institutional
misconduct"

Id^_ at 1276 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 2.34(b)(1978)). The

Parole Commission contended that letters received, after the
granting of a parole date, from the U.S. Attorney's office and the
Internal Revenue Service concerning the petitioner's involvement in
a

tax

fraud

information.

scheme

at

the

federal

prison

constituted

new

The court rejected this claim, stating that the

Parole Commission was or should have been aware of allegations
concerning petitioner's involvement in the tax fraud scheme at the
time it made its original parole determination.
letters

on

the

same

subject

could

not

be

Thus, the later
considered

"new

information" within the meaning of the regulation. Id. at 1276-77.
Rather, "new information" could only be read to include that
information which the Parole Commission previously did not know or
could not have known of.

Id. at 1277.

A review of the record in this case shows that the trial court
found

three pieces of evidence served as the basis for rescission

of Northern's parole date. The first was that Northern had a drug
problem and abused drugs during the first two years of his
incarceration.

The Board of Pardons learned of this evidence in

the summer of 1984 yet reaffirmed Northern's May 1988 parole date
in September 1984.
The second piece of evidence used by the Board of Pardons' was
10

that Northern admitted in February 1988 to using marijuana on
February 25, 1988. Again this evidence, submitted by the Duchesne
Jail in writing to the prison, was known by the Board of Pardons
prior to May 1988 but was not raised as a problem in the April 19,
1988, hearing3.

Instead, the Board of Pardons, through Paul

Larsen, continued to work with Northern in an attempt to work out
the details of Northern's parole supervision.
The third piece of evidence was a psychological evaluation of
Northern dated May 5, 1988.

This evaluation specifically noted

that the Board of Pardons was to consider the report a favorable
one.

See, Addendum C to Brief of Appellant.
The term "new evidence" can only be read to encompass this

third piece of evidence. Only this evidence was previously unknown
to the Board of Pardons; all other evidence was known to the Board
of Pardons but deliberately not acted upon.
Additionally, although "new evidence", this report is not a
sufficient basis for rescission under Rule 3.10.

Rule

3.10

required that the Board of Pardons have new evidence that Northern
presented "a serious risk or danger to the community" before
rescinding his parole date.

A report which states that Northern

has shown a great deal of growth and maturing, does not have the
capacity

for violent acting out, responds to authority when

necessary and, most importantly, specifically states that it is to
be regarded as a favorable one can hardly be considered evidence

3

A copy of the transcript of this hearing is included in the
Appellees7 Brief as Addendum B.
11

that Northern presented such a serious risk or danger.

Thus, the

Board of Pardons had no basis under its own Rule 3.10 to rescind
Northern's parole and its actions of May 9, 1988, only served to
deprive Northern of his constitutional right to due process.4

E.

UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, THE BOARD OF PARDONS WAS
REQUIRED TO GIVE NORTHERN NOTICE AND A HEARING BEFORE
RESCINDING HIS MAY 1988 PAROLE DATE.

On May 9, 1988, one day before he was to be paroled, the Board
of Pardons rescinded Northern's parole date. This action was taken
without any notice to Northern and without benefit of a rescission
hearing, both of which were required by Rule 3.10.

The State

contends that Board of Pardons' actions fell within the exception
to Rule 3.10.

Again, given its plain and literal meaning, the

language of Rule 3.10 does not support this contention.
In May 1988, Rule 3.10-2 reads as follows:
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing
date, information shall be provided to the Board
establishing the basis for the rescission hearing. Upon
receipt of such information, the offender will be
scheduled for a rescission hearing.
Except under
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will be
notified of all allegation and the date of the scheduled
hearing at least seven days in advance.
The State argues that the Board of Pardon's failure to give
notice and hold a hearing before rescinding Northern's parole date
was justified under the extraordinary circumstance language of the
4

Fundamental notions of due process require that the Board of
Pardons adhere to its own rules and any failure to do so is
violative of constitutional due process protections.
See,
International House v. National Labor Relations Board, 676 F.2d
906, 912 (2d Cir. 1982); Government of Canal Zone v. Brooks, 427
F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1970).
12

third sentence.

This position clearly misreads the Rule.

The

exceptional circumstance language only applies to the requirement
that the prisoner be given seven days notice of the allegations
against him and the hearing.

It does not totally waive the notice

and hearing requirements as the State would have this Court
believe.

Under any circumstances, Northern was entitled to some

notice of the allegations against him and to a hearing before
having his parole date rescinded. Northern has never been informed
of the allegations against him5.

Further, a hearing held some two

months after rescission of the parole date can hardly be considered
compliance with Rule 3.106. Thus, by completely ignoring its own
procedural rules, the Board of Pardons has denied Northern his

5

A failure to give notice creates a great risk that erroneous
information may serve as a basis for decisions made by the Board of
Pardons. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissenting opinion in
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex 442
U.S. 1 (1979), prison and parole files often contain errors.
Justice Marshall cited the following as examples:
Kohlman v.
Norton, 380 F.Supp. 1073 (D.Conn. 1974)(parole denied because file
erroneously indicated that applicant had used gun in committing
robbery); Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Board,
373 F.Supp. 699 (N.D.Miss. 1974)(prisoner denied parole on basis of
illegal disciplinary action); In re Rodriguez. 537 P. 2d 384
(Cal.App. 1975)(factually incorrect material in file led parole
officers to believe that prisoner had violent tendencies and that
his family rejected him); State v. Pohlabel, 160 A. 2d 647
(N.J.Super. 1960)(files erroneously showed that prisoner was under
a life sentence in another jurisdiction); Hearings on H.R. 13118 et
al. before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. VII-A, p. 451 (1972)(testimony of Dr. Willard
Gaylin: "I have seen black men listed as white and Harvard
graduates listed with borderline IQ's"). Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at
33 n. 15.
6

Paul Boyden, a member of the Board of Pardons which
rescinded Northern's parole date, expressly recognized that
rescinding a parole date without a hearing and then later holding
a hearing was improper. Deposition of Paul Boyden, p. 49.
13

liberty without the requisite due process of law.7

F.

THE BOARD OF PARDONS7 FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH EVEN THE
MOST FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS SERVED TO
SUBJECT NORTHERN TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

The State suggests that the Board of Pardons 7 actions in this
case were well within the standards of decency accepted by our
society and that the punishment inflicted on Northern was not cruel
and unusual.
"the

Board

In support of this position, the State asserts that
of

Pardons

could

rescind

a

scheduled

termination date at any time prior to an inmates

parole

or

[sic] release

without infringing upon any constitutional right of an inmate."
Brief of Appellees, p. 21.

By this statement, the State has again

demonstrated its ignorance of the Foote decision and its continuing
belief that Board of Pardons is all powerful, answering to no one,
accountable to no court.

Punishment by such tyrants is one of the

very evils that both the United States and Utah Constitutions seek
to prevent.
Punishments

in our society are determined only after due

process has been afforded.

We no longer endorse the playing of

cruel mind games on inmates, such as dangling a release date in
front of a prisoner, only to take that date away at the last

7

Northern in no way concedes that any
exceptional
circumstances existed at the time his parole was rescinded.
Northern had been incarcerated for nearly 8 years during which time
the Board of Pardons could have requested a psychological
evaluation.
The Board of Pardons' failure to request such an
evaluation until shortly before Northern's scheduled parole cannot
be considered an exceptional circumstance as the term is used in
Rule 3.10.
14

moment, solely on the whim of the Board of Pardons.

This type of

action shocks the moral conscience of our society and this Court
must condemn and put an end to any such future actions by the Board
of Pardons.

CONCLUSION
This Court is not asked to decide whether the Board of
Pardons' decision concerning Northern was correct.

Rather, the

Court is asked to decide whether, based on the findings of fact and
the record in the case below, the trial court was correct in
concluding

that

the

Board

of

Pardons

afforded

Northern

the

requisite due process in reaching its decision and acted on a
lawful basis to rescind Northern's parole date.

By violating its

own policies and procedures and substituting its harsher judgment
of Northern and his crime for that of an earlier Board, the Board
of Pardons has exhibited complete disdain for even the most
fundamental notions of due process and the Court cannot allow such
actions to continue. Northern's recent parole does not render this
action moot.

Issues of great public concern remain before the

Court and the Court may afford Northern relief beyond that which he
has now been given.

15

DATED this 9th day of September, 1991.
Respectfully submitted,
HALEY & STOLEBARGER

(u^y^t

/pLAJ^^^^h^

Jo^Carol Nesset-Sale
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 9th
day of September, 1991:
R. Paul Van Dam
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Kirk M. Torgensen
Assistant Attorney General
6100 South 300 East, Suite 403
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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ADDENDUM A
Waiver of Personal Appearance

Uambara
Norman H. Bangtrtar
Governor
RL(Pata)Hiun
Chairman

Donald E Blanchard
MlchaalR.SIbbatt
Wttrtam L. Piurf

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WAIVER OF PERSONAL APPEARANCE

-'

^

#-

KENDALL QUiNN NOKTHERN

I»

, USP#

15009

understand I have the right to appear before the Board of Pardons in regard to
the addition of special conditions to my Parole Agreement. I hereby waive my
personal appearance before the Utah State Board of Pardons end request that my
Parole Agreement be amended to include the following condition(s):
ii tiji

I

•' '

"~~

'

" "

"" " - - •

"

• r niirr •

i

n u\ •nil ~ - i

PAY RESTITUTION IN THE AMOUNT OF $26,350-00 on CASE #CR80-264

witness

i •inri~

~i_ -

ADDENDUM B
Letter from Paul Larsen to Jo Carol Nesset-Sale
Dated July 25, 1991

State of Utah
BOARD OF PARDONS
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor
H.L. (Pete) Haun
Chairman
Donald E. Blanchard
Michael R. Sibbett
William L. Peters
Heather N. Cooke
Members

448 East 6400 South - Suite 300
Murray, Utah 84107
(801)261-6464

July 25, 1991
Ms. Jo Carol Nesset-Sale
Attorney at Law
Haley and Stolebarger
Tenth Floor Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1956
RE:

Kendall Nbrthem, USP # 15009

Dear Jo Carol,
In response to your inquiry of July 10, 1991, please find enclosed with
this letter a copy of your client's Waiver of Personal Appearance and a copy
of the Disposition Form relative to his restitution.
In your letter you expressed concern that it appeared to you the issue of
your client's "restitution had been delayed until Kendall's parole date was
imminent (permitting no choice but to sign or jeopardize his parole date).1'
That really was not the case at all. As is commonly done with inmates whose
parole dates are approaching, a hearing had been set for Monday, July 15,
1991, for the purpose of determining the amount of Mr. Northern's
restitution. Prior to the hearing, a tentative formula and restitution amount
had been worked out for discussion at the hearing. In keeping with usual
practice, that information was made available to the inmate - in this case,
your client - for prior review so the administrative burden of holding the
hearing could be avoided if the inmate had no dispute with the tentative
figure. Mr. Northern was presented with the figure, he expressed no
disagreement, and he then voluntarily waived his right to have a hearing on
the matter. Had Mr. Northern opted to have the hearing instead, that decision
would have in no way delayed his scheduled release on parole, even if the
hearing had for some reason extended beyond his parole date. Mr. Northern
appeared to understand that his parole date would not be jeopardized by his
refusal to sign the waiver and to proceed with a restitution hearing instead
(the hearing already being firmly scheduled on a date prior to his scheduled
parole release) but signed the enclosed waiver, thus avoiding a formal hearing*

Letter to Jo Carol Nesset-Sale
July 22, 1991,
Page Two

The restitution amount to which your client agreed was computed as
follows:
(1) Lost Income Compensation:
Prior to his death, the victim, Mr. Hamby, earned approximately $12,000
yearly driving a taxi cab. Using the workman's compensation approach which
awards two-thirds of the deceased spouse's gross income to the surviving
spouse, Mrs. Hamby should be entitled to $8,000 per year of lost income from
the time of her husband's death until the time she remarried, ten years
later. Thus, restitution for lost income compensation equals $80,000.
(2) Child Care Compensation:
Applying the standard figure of $2,600 per year per child for
professional child care, the cost to Mrs. Hamby of child care for each of her
seven children until each reached the age of thirteen would amount to
$145,600, as illustrated below:
Child's age at
father's death:
6 mo's
18 mo's
4 vrs
5 vrs
6 vrs
Years remaining
before age 13:
12 yrs
11 vrs
9 vrs
8 vrs
7 vrs
Annual cost of
child care:
2.600
2.600
2.600
2.600
2.600
Total per child:
31,200
28,600 23,400 20,800 18,200
Sum of seven figures above = $145,600

8 vrs

9 vrs

5 vrs

4 vrs

2.600
13,000

2.600
10,400

It might conservatively be assumed, however, that once the oldest two
children reached the age of thirteen, they would be able to accept babysitting
responsibilities for their younger siblings. Therefore the restitution amount
expected for child care compensation is limited to the cost of child care for
the two oldest children until each is thirteen, $13,000 + $10,400 = $23,400.
(3) Funeral Expenses:
The actual figure submitted to the Board of Pardons was $2,000.
(4) Degree of Mr. Northern's Responsibility:
$80,000 lost income compensation, plus $23,400 child care compensation,
plus $2,000 funeral expenses equals $105,400. It was the decision of the
Board that Mr. Northern should be held responsible for twenty-five percent of
that total loss amount, thus yielding the final restitution figure of $26,350.
If you have any other questions, feel free to contact me.
Sincerely yours,

PAUL LARSEN
Senior Hearing Officer

ADDENDUM C
Board of Pardons Decision Dated July 8, 1988

Members
PAULW.BOYDEN
VICTORIA J. PALACIOS
GARY L WEBSTER

PAUL W.SHEFFIELD.
Administrator

THE STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF PARDONS
6065 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

BEFORE THE B O A R D O F P A R D O N S O F THE STATE O F UTAH
v A n r\ M
iConsideration of the Status of ^ n a a i l q . Northern

> Uta h

OBSCBNo.
State Prison No.

miwo9
ii

The above-entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Utah State Board of Pardons on the _
day of.
198 "for consideration as:
Sth
Julv
1. • ORIGINAL HEARING
5. R ^ SPECIAL
PE
ATTENTION OF THE BOARD
2 U REHEARING
RESCISSION
6. f j RES
3. n REDETERMINATION
4. • TERMINATION OF SENTENCE AND PAROLE
After the statement of
/*£/y#g.l/
A'Or-TA-Pro
. and the following witness(es)
1)
2L
and good cause appearing, the Board made the following decision:.
w ^-

T-/D

SJ Rescind

_, 19 u^> parole date,

•

Parole to become effective.

•

Amend parole agreement to add the following special conditions:

, 19

, with the following special conditions:

2.
3.
4.

M<^

* M Rehearing for

^CACi-fm

Afpr°pri

, 19_2£2»fo/the following reasons:

*/fc

•

Termination of sentence and parole to become effective _

•

Expiration of sentence
REMARKS:

fiis:kf m
.,19-

.,19

? f t r ^

faSr)

Crime

Criminal Homicide
.Aggravated Kobbery
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

fff- jryo-tffl.
Qrd-fr A-il<?mM- r^fO^h
XKfn^

Sentence

JL-life
-i-Life

Case No.

GRSQ=264
CR8Q-264

Judge

Baldwin
Baldwin

ExpinDate

-fcifer

K is further ordered that in the event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of rules and regulations of the Utah State
Prison, any community corrections center or other residential facility, or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned or is found
in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of this decision, the order may be made null and void.
Jul
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date
y
8
signature as Administrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.

j 1&

affixed my

03aM

Paul

An applicationforredetermination may b
WHITE COPY-BOARD

previous action. Applications may be ot
N o r t h e r n v Barnes e t .
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